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Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is one of the world’s largest 
food security programs. The program supports chronically food insecure rural 
households and at the same time promotes long-term food security through 
the creation of rural infrastructure. While studies on the PSNP have examined 
various features of the program, there is limited knowledge on the quality and 
durability of infrastructure built through the program. Ensuring and 
maintaining the quality of local public goods built through the PSNP and 
similar social protection programs is a costly and recurring issue. Motivated by 
the long-term objective of the program, this paper analyses the role played by a 
key design feature of the PSNP, that is, its Community Based Participatory 
Watershed Development approach in influencing a project’s physical condition 
and its operational status. The paper is based on survey data and technical 
assessments provided by soil and water conservation engineers covering a 
sample of 249 Soil and Water Conservation (SWC) projects located in 53 
watershed communities. The survey is complemented by qualitative 
information gathered through interviews and discussions. The location of 
multiple projects, with differing levels of participation in the same watershed 
communities permits estimation of the effects of community participation after 
controlling for community fixed effects. We find that projects in which 
beneficiaries play a larger role in project monitoring and evaluation are 
substantially less likely to be damaged and be in better operational condition. 
These results support the idea that community participation translates into 
more durable infrastructure. 
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Since the mass famine in 1983-84, Ethiopia has tried different measures to tackle deep-rooted 
poverty. These range from regular annual food aid to emergency food assistance. The latter has 
been delivered either as payments for public works or direct support. Though these measures have 
been successful in averting mass starvation, they have not yet banished the threat of further food 
insecurity. Keeping this in mind, recent efforts have focused on the promotion of rural livelihoods 
by building local infrastructure assets through different food security programs (MoARD, 2010).  
In 2003, the government initiated a consultation with development partners for an 
alternative to the existing emergency response of channelling food aid to fill consumption gaps. 
This alternative was aimed at supporting the needs of chronically food insecure households while 
at the same time developing long-term solutions to tackle the root causes of food insecurity. The 
process ended by proposing a Food Security Program (FSP) which encompassed a shift from an 
emergency relief system to sustainable food security. This program was formally launched in 
January 2005 with the name Productive Safety Net Program or PSNP (Gilligan et al., 2009). The 
PSNP has three inter-connected objectives. First, to protect beneficiaries against hunger by 
providing cash and/or food during periods of food shortage, second, to prevent further 
impoverishment by protecting the sale of household assets and third, to promote sustainable 
livelihoods by building local infrastructure assets. While the first two objectives may be classified 
as short-term, the third objective is related to the long-term solution of addressing the problems 
of food insecurity (Devereux et al., 2006).  
Unlike preceding interventions, the PSNP program has several distinguishing features. 
First, there is a distinction between direct support (DS) and public work (PW) beneficiaries. The 
former includes vulnerable but labour constrained households who receive support from the 
program but are not expected to provide any labour contribution, while the latter are expected to 
provide time and help build community assets. Second, according to MoARD (2005), natural 
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resource degradation in general, and soil erosion and drying up of water sources in particular, are 
the root causes behind declining agricultural production which eventually leads to poverty and 
food insecurity. Consistent with this analysis, natural resource management using soil conservation 
and flood control structures, together with water harvesting and water conservation projects are 
the most important components of the public works projects implemented under PSNP. Finally, 
in order to achieve its long-term objectives of creating and maintaining quality local rural 
infrastructure assets the programme has adopted a so-called Community Based Participatory 
Watershed Development (CBPWD) approach which requires active participation of the 
community in the overall program cycle. As is by now quite widely known, the aim of such 
community based development initiatives is to reverse the traditional top-down approach and 
allow beneficiaries (the community) to participate in all aspects of watershed development by 
involving them in the selection, implementation, management and maintenance of projects.     
Since its inception, the PSNP has attracted a large body of empirical work. A number of 
these studies have evaluated the targeting efficacy of the PSNP (Nigussa and Mbrengwa, 2009); its 
impact on assets, food security and consumption, diversification (for example, Knippenerg and 
Hoddinott, 2017; Mohamed, 2017; Béné et al., 2012; Hoddinott et al., 2012; Berhane et al., 2011; 
Andersson et al., 2011; Gilligan et al., 2009) and its unintended but positive impact on emission of 
greenhouse gases (Woolf et al., 2018; Woolf et al., 2015).1 While the results vary across studies, 
depending on the district and the region under scrutiny, the literature tends to suggest that the 
PSNP has had a positive effect on a range of outcomes, including enhancing household resilience 
                                                          
1 Based on data collected from 24 PSNP districts located in six PSNP regions (Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, SNNPR 
and Tigray), Woolf et al. (2018) estimate the emission of greenhouse gases in districts covered and not covered by the 
PSNP. Using summary statistics and two-sided t-tests, they find that sites covered by the PSNP emit far less 
greenhouse gases as compared to those without. They argue that the reduction in GHG in PSNP areas may be 
attributed to the soil and water conservation activities of the PSNP which have resulted in better land management 
and reduced land degradation. 
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to covariate shocks and asset accumulation.2 Despite the large funds devoted to the creation of 
rural infrastructures by the program (mainly as transfer payments for the public work participants) 
and the wide range of studies on the program, the effect of the program and in particular its 
participatory approach on the quality of rural infrastructure which underpins the program’s long-
term objectives is still awaited although Construction of durable assets is vital for the realization 
of the long term objective of the PSNP.  
Motivated by the long-term objective of the program and its participatory approach, the 
current study aims at analysing the effectiveness of community participation in determining the 
quality and durability, as measured by project damage and project operational status, of local public 
goods built through the PSNP. In particular the study provides: (i) an assessment of the extent of 
community participation in various project-related decisions (ii) an assessment of the condition of 
community assets in terms of project damage and operational status and (iii) an examination of 
the effect of community participation in determining the condition of assets built through the 
PSNP.  
The paper draws on primary data collected from 249 rural projects constructed between 
2005 and 2013 which are located in 53 watershed communities in four food insecure districts 
located in Ethiopia’s Oromia region - a region where the PSNP is particularly active. Due to the 
                                                          
2 Knippenberg and Hoddinott (2017) examine the effect of the PSNP on mitigating the effects of drought. Using 
survey data from multiple years they find that PSNP payments lead to a reduction in the initial impact of drought on 
food security by 57 percent and an elimination of the adverse drought impact within two years.  Based on an analysis 
of cross section data from 160 households located in a food insecure district, Mohammed (2017) finds that the PSNP 
has a positive and significant effect on food consumption but no effect on income. Béné et al. (2012) use panel data 
from 2006 and 2008 and conclude that the effect of the PSNP is limited and not strong enough to completely protect 
beneficiaries against the impacts of severe shocks. Using Ethiopian Food Security Surveys (EFSSs) collected in 2006, 
2008 and 2010, Hoddinott et al. (2012) conclude that household access to the PSNP and Other Food Security 
Programmes (OFSP) and the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) has led to increased use of fertilizer as 
well as enhanced investments in agriculture. Berhane et al. (2011) compare the effect of longer term (five years) versus 
and short term (one year) participation in the public works programs on livestock holdings and report that longer 
participation raises livestock holdings by 0.38 tropical livestock units (TLU).  Andersson et al. (2011) use three rounds 
of panel data (2002, 2005, 2007) from one of the country’s regions to examine the impact of the PSNP on household 
holdings of livestock and trees. They find that while the PSNP has a positive impact on tree holdings there is no 
impact on livestock holdings. Gilligan et al. (2009) use cross-section data collected 18 months after the launch of the 
PSNP to examine the impact of the PSNP and other safety net programs (OSNP) on a range of household economic 
outcomes. They find that the PSNP on its own is not very effective but in combination with the OSNP there is a 
positive impact on food security, enhanced use of improved agricultural technologies, and greater probability of 




focus of the PSNP public works, attention is restricted to soil and water conservation structures. 
Data were collected through a field survey which included beneficiary self-assessment as well as 
on-site observations and assessments by soil and water conservation engineers. The surveys were 
augmented with qualitative data gathered using Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs).  
To preview our results, we find an overall high degree of participation ranging from 72 to 
83 percent across the 12 participation decisions although there were substantial variations in 
participation rates across the four districts. The variation in participation across districts is 
paralleled with variations in project outcomes whereby project damage was about 50 percent in 
districts in districts with relatively low levels of participation and about half that in those districts 
with almost complete participation. Exploring the availability of multiple projects located in the 
same watershed community to identify the effect of variations in community participation on 
variations in project outcomes within the same community, we find that community participation 
in project monitoring and evaluation played a substantial role in enhancing the physical and 
operational state of projects. Our estimates showed that the damage of projects found in areas 
with high participation is reduced by 50% compared to those projects found in areas which have 
relatively low participation 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
theory and empirical evidence on the role of community participation in development 
interventions. Section 3 provides details on the PSNP and its Public Works component. Section 4 
outlines the data and methodology. Section 5 discusses the findings while the final section 
concludes.   
 
2. Community Participation – Theory and Evidence  
In the last two decades, driven by disenchantment with centralized modes of governance, waves 
of decentralization have occurred in countries covering half the world’s population (Bardhan and 
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Mookherjee, 2006) and large sums of money (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) have been ploughed into 
poverty-alleviation projects which directly involve project beneficiaries (the community) in some 
or all aspects of project design, implementation and management. This trend has been motivated 
by the perception that a centralized government breeds corruption and rent-seeking and is 
unaccountable. Decentralization of control over resources and divestment of authority to local 
governments coupled with community participation has been offered as an approach to enhance 
beneficiary targeting, foster the adoption of projects that are more closely aligned to local 
preferences, improve service delivery and reduce corruption.3 Notwithstanding these expectations, 
theoretically, there is no guarantee that such outcomes will occur (Waller et al. 2002). 
Arguments in favour of decentralization and community participation centre around the 
role of local information in leading to more informed decisions and through the provision of 
agency, voice and control to project beneficiaries, a stronger link between allocation of funds and 
local preferences. Such control and preference matching may be expected, among other outcomes, 
to lead to more durable and better-maintained community assets (Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin, 
1987; Mansuri and Rao, 2013:182; Nkwake et al., 2013). However, it is also possible that due to 
“local capture”, development outcomes will continue to mirror or perhaps worsen as compared 
to a more centralised system as bureaucratic and political power moves downward (Platteau and 
Gaspart, 2003; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007).  
The theoretical debates on the relative merits of decentralization and community 
participation have fostered a large empirical literature which has been comprehensively reviewed 
by Mansuri and Rao (2013). Their report focuses on three issues, namely, evidence of local elite 
capture, the role of participation in strengthening civil society and most pertinently for the current 
paper, the impact of participation on development outcomes including the quality of local 
                                                          
3 While there are several flavours of community participation with different monikers and different levels of 
community involvement, two broad approaches are discernible. These are, Community Based Development (CBD) 
which refers to development projects that actively involve beneficiary communities in decisions related to design and 
management and Community Driven Development (CDD) which goes beyond CBD and involves communities in 
the allocation and management of funds (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 1-2). 
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infrastructure. Compared to the range of studies on various dimensions of participation, the 
literature on the role of participation in determining the quality of local infrastructure is quite thin.  
Only a handful of studies have explored the link between participation and the quality of public 
works infrastructure. These include, Narayan (1995), Prokopy (2005), a pair of studies by Khwaja 
(2004, 2009) and Mansuri (2012).   
Based on a global study of evaluation reports covering 121 rural water supply projects in 
49 developing countries, Narayan (1995) concluded that overall beneficiary participation 
throughout the project cycle (design to maintenance) was a significant factor in ensuring overall 
project effectiveness and success.4 Overall project effectiveness and success was generated by using 
factor analysis of twenty performance indicators. The analysis was based on cross-section data and 
relied on multivariate regression analysis using a score of participation (one indicating zero 
participation and seven indicating high participation in decision making as well as control of 
resources) as the main explanatory variable. The quantitative analysis was combined with 
systematic qualitative analysis of some selected cases. Although the study is innovative in terms of 
attempting to examine the effect of participation on project outcomes, the paper’s use of factor 
analysis and an overall measure of participation makes it impossible to identify the effect of a 
specific participation decisions on a specific project outcome.   
Building on Narayan (1995), Prokopy (2005) explored the relationship between five project 
outcomes and two measures of participation - beneficiary contribution to the capital cost of 
projects and household involvement in decision making.5 Based on cross-section data collected 
from World Bank assisted water supply and sanitation projects in 45 villages in two Indian states, 
                                                          
4 The projects were established by eighteen different agencies located in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The evaluation 
reports for the study report were based on impact assessments carried out by experienced evaluators.  
5 The five outcome variables are the percentage of households (i) reporting satisfaction with the new project (ii) that 
have paid tariffs (iii) stated that access to water is more equal (iv) reporting time savings (v) who think that the village 
can sustain the system for 10 years. The participation variables are the percentage of households that have contributed 
to the capital cost of the project and household involvement in decision making who are aware of project prior to its 
construction, attended planning meeting, participated in more than one decision, supervised construction work, 
attended post construction meeting and the percentage of households that have contributed to the project cost.  
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the author showed that both measures of participation significantly enhance three out of the five 
outcomes (village level satisfaction, equal access to water and time savings) based on which the 
author recommends encouraging both measures of participation. The author admits the existence 
of reverse causality between participation and project outcomes and attempts to address this 
concern by using pre-project participation measures. However, four of the five outcomes remain 
susceptible to reverse causation. Furthermore, the outcomes used in the paper are mainly 
subjective.       
Based on cross-section data analysis of 132 infrastructure projects in 99 rural communities 
located in Northern Pakistan, Khwaja (2004, 2009)6 finds that projects constructed by the 
government, which implies lower levels of participation, have a maintenance score which is 23.6 
percentage points lower (implying maintenance is less likely to have been carried out) than NGO-
initiated projects.  Highlighting the importance of community capacity, the paper finds that 
communities are better able to maintain projects that are less complex and which are being 
refurbished as compared to new projects. An interesting twist is the finding that community 
participation in non-technical decisions is associated with a 55 percentage point increase in 
maintenance score while greater community participation in technical decisions is associated with 
a 39 percentage point reduction in the maintenance score. The author also finds that there is a U-
shaped relationship between greater inequality in project returns and maintenance. That is, as 
inequality increases there is a decline in the extent to which project maintenance needs are met but 
increases beyond a certain threshold as high levels of inequality indicate that the project has 
effectively been privatized.   
Mansuri (2012) extends Khwaja’s work by examining the link between community 
participation and project outcome quality using cross-section data on 230 infrastructure projects 
located in 80 villages in three of Pakistan’s largest provinces. Half the projects in the sample were 
                                                          
6 The 2009 study includes only 64 of the projects located in 33 communities in Baltistan North Pakistan. 
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constructed through Pakistan’s National Rural Support Program (NRSP), which adopts a 
participatory approach, while the remainder were constructed by the concerned government 
departments. Design and construction, and current condition and maintenance are the main 
outcomes assessed in the study. Mansuri (2012) finds that participatory projects are better designed 
and constructed as compared to projects constructed without substantial community participation. 
Similar to Khwaja (2009), the study finds that such projects are also better maintained.  The paper 
argues that this may be due to NRSP’s approach to project maintenance where such costs are 
included as part of project costs at the proposal stage although the community is responsible for 
project maintenance.  On a negative note, Mansuri (2012) finds that the distribution of project 
benefits is not sensitive to project type and regardless of whether a project has been constructed 
through the NRSP or government line departments, the share of marginalized groups in accessing 
project benefits is far less than their share in the population.  
A recent narrative synthesis of the effect of community-driven development (CDD) 
projects on various outcomes including the quantity and quality of infrastructure is provided by 
White et al. (2018).7 A unique element is that the report draws on the grey literature and compiles 
evidence from program documents, process evaluations and qualitative research papers. The 
authors conclude that CDD projects have led to substantial increases in the quantity of small-scale 
infrastructure although in terms of their (technical) quality, the evidence is mixed and varies across 
countries. Similarly, effects on most welfare outcomes (health, education) are insignificant except 
in the case of the effect of improved water supply on time savings.  
While the studies discussed above look directly at the effect of community participation 
on project outcomes, a point emerging from these studies is a community’s capacity in maintaining 
project quality. A related strand of the literature examines this aspect directly and concludes that 
the inability of communities to maintain projects is not an indictment of the participatory approach 
                                                          
7 The study is based on 25 impact evaluations of 23 programmes implemented in 21 low and middle income countries.  
9 
 
but a failure to provide adequate post-construction financial and technical support.  For instance, 
based on their global review of water projects, Katz and Sara (1997) argue that inadequate technical 
support is one of the main reasons for project failure.  Isham and Kähkönen (2002) reach a similar 
conclusion on the basis of their analysis of water projects in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. 
Echoing this conclusion, in their impact evaluation of the Bolivian social find, Newman et al. 
(2002) find that water projects were associated with increases in water quality only if communities 
also received training. An interesting study which examines the long-term sustainability of 
participatory rural water pipeline schemes in Malawi is provided by Kleemeier (2000).  Based on 
an examination of 12 schemes which were constructed 3 to 26 years prior to the time she 
conducted her analysis, Kleemeier finds that about half the schemes are not functioning well. She 
goes on to conclude that participatory community organizations are capable of managing relatively 
small schemes, but do not have the technical and management capacity to handle larger schemes. 
Although not explicit, in their review, White et al. (2018) do not indict the CDD approach but 
suggest that the poor quality of infrastructure projects may be attributed to poor supervision, 
poorly qualified contractors and engineers and insufficient capacity of implementing agencies.  
As far as the PSNP program is concerned, soon after its commencement the Government 
of Ethiopia (2006) conducted a review of the public works program. While the report pointed out 
variations in project quality perhaps linked to differences in implementation capacity, the main 
conclusion was that most projects implemented through the PSNP, especially roads, irrigation and 
water supply projects, have failed to meet minimum technical standards. While there have been no 
attempts to examine the impact of these projects on economic outcomes, in their review of social 
protection programs in Ethiopia, Devereux and Guenther (2009) expect that the economic impact 
of such PSNP constructed assets is likely to be negligible. It is likely that the limited attention paid 
to the quality of public works in the initial years of the programme may have been driven by an 
immediate focus on other program objectives. In any case, a necessary condition for project 
returns is adequate project quality and maintenance which in turn calls for an investigation of 
10 
 
whether the community-based approach used in the PSNP program has any bearing on such 
outcomes.  
  
3. The Productive Safety Net Program – A Brief Overview 
The PSNP program, which operates in food insecure districts of the country, has been operating 
since January 2005 and is currently in its third phase (2015/16 – 2019/20).8  This phase builds on 
the efforts of the first and second phase and stresses the achievement of the program’s objectives 
by forging links between the PSNP and other food security programs (MoARD, 2010). Currently, 
the programme covers 319 food insecure districts or about 40 percent of the country’s districts 
(MoA, 2014; Woolf et al., 2018, UNICEF, 2016). The main objectives of the program remain 
unchanged and the focus is on shifting the trend from meeting short term food needs through 
emergency relief, to addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity. As discussed by Devereux 
and Guenther (2009), the three main objectives are to protect households by providing resources 
to smooth consumption during the dry season, protect households by preventing sales of 
household assets and reduce the probability of borrowing and finally promote livelihoods by 
building community assets with development potential.  In 2013/14, the year before the data for 
this study was collected, the program had a cash budget of about $205 million and access to food 
resources to the tune of 274,844 metric tonnes and provided social transfers to about 6 million 
food insecure individuals either through “public works” activities (4.8 million) or as “direct 
support” (1.2 million) for labor constrained households (MoA 2013).  
Beneficiaries of the public work component are expected to undertake public works activities 
in six major areas – these are, soil and water conservation/water harvesting, construction of rural 
feeder roads, bridges and fords, water supply for animal and human use, creation of social 
infrastructure (schools, health and animal posts), small scale irrigation activities, and agricultural 
                                                          
8 A district is classified as food insecure on the basis of the frequency of requiring food assistance in the ten years 
preceding 2004. Food insecure households within such districts are households who fail to produce enough to meet 
their consumption needs even when there is normal rainfall (MoARD, 2010: 8). 
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activities related to composting and farmers training. Among these categories, soil and water 
conservation/water harvesting is the dominant activity and accounts for more than 70 percent of 
the total public works projects in most districts (MoARD, 2010). Project beneficiaries are expected 
to be involved in all elements of the public works project cycle.  
The overall approach is called Community Based Participatory Watershed Development 
(CBPWD) and the overarching objective of the participatory model is: “…to generate greater 
cohesion within the society and enable its poorest members to benefit from the various assets 
created and eventually to overcome their food insecurity”. The project implementation manual 
contains a detailed guide on the steps that need to be followed to ensure community involvement 
from project inception, to implementation and maintenance. Based on the CBPWD guidelines 
each watershed needs to form a Community Watershed Development Committee (CWSDC) and 
watershed residents need to participate in various activities. Based on the manual, four major 
categories of participation may be identified. These four participation categories are participation 
in planning and implementation; project usage and benefit distribution; maintenance; project 
monitoring and evaluation.  Within each of these broad categories there are several sub-categories 
and beneficiaries are expected to play a role in determining each of these outcomes. As is discussed 
in the next section, the data collection efforts were guided by the CBPWD and attempted to 
measure community participation in each of the four broad categories as well as various sub-
categories. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Approach  
4.1 Data 
The study relies on data collected between August 2014 and January 2015 from four food insecure 
districts (Yabello, Kuyu, Arsi Negelle and Doba) located in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.9 Of the 319 
                                                          
9 The PSNP is very active in the region. The region accounts for close to 21 percent of all PSNP project beneficiaries. 
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districts where the PSNP operates, 25 percent are located in this region.10 These 79 PSNP districts 
may be divided into three agro ecological climatic zones, that is, low altitude (kola), mid altitude 
(woynadega) and high altitude (dega). Some districts have features of all three agro-climatic zones. 
The three climatic zones (low, mid, high) account for about 30, 34 and 7 districts, respectively, of 
the total PSNP districts in the region while the remaining 8 consists of districts with mixed features. 
In order to ensure representation of each agro-ecology in the sample, one district was randomly 
selected from each of the three climatic zones.11 In addition a fourth district which has mixed 
features was also selected. Map 1 indicates the location of the four sample districts. Given the 
predominance of natural resource - soil and water conservation/harvesting projects in the PSNP’s 
portfolio, data collection was restricted to these two project categories.12  
Subsequently, due to financial and logistical reasons, we decided to collect data from 20 
percent or 17 of the 84 PSNP villages located in the four randomly chosen districts.  Based on the 
share of each district in the total number of PSNP villages we selected 4, 3, 4 and 6 villages to be 
surveyed from Yabello, Arsi Negelle, Kuyu, and Doba districts, respectively.  Within each village, 
based on the share of person days allocated for soil and water projects, we planned to gather 
information on about 15 (in the case of Kuyu and Yabello) and 20 (in the case of Arsi Negelle and 
Doba) soil and water conservation projects per village with an overall plan of covering 295 
structures in the four districts. Due to logistical challenges the target could not be reached and the 
study is based on surveying 249 projects located in 17 villages spread over 53 watershed 
communities. The number of households residing in a watershed ranges between a minimum of 
15 to a maximum of 300.   
                                                          
10 The figures are based on the 2013/14 program data.   
11 Yabello was randomly selected from a group of thirty predominantly low altitude districts, Arsi Negelle from a 
group of thirty four predominantly mid-altitude districts while Kuyu was picked from a group of seven predominantly 
high altitude districts. Doba belongs to the group of eight districts with mixed features.  
12 Across the four districts, on average, soil and water conservation projects account for 73 percent of the annual 
person days spent on public works activities. In the four sample districts, the figure ranges from with a minimum of 
65 percent in the case of Kuyu to a maximum of 79 percent in the case of Doba. 
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Given the nature of the public works, two types of questionnaires were administered. The 
first, a collective questionnaire, was administered to a so-called Structure Response Group (SRG) 
which consisted of four to six beneficiaries. A total of 1,238 individuals participated in the 249 
SRG.13 To be part of the SRG, an individual had to be a resident of the watershed community and 
a participant in the public works program. Individuals were randomly selected from a list of public 
works beneficiaries available at the watershed community level and randomly assigned to a 
structure response group. The SRG questionnaire gathered information on watershed community 
traits (number of households in the watershed, access to public facilities) project characteristics 
(type, age, new or refurbished), formation of the CWSDC and information on current operational 
and physical status of the project. Immediately after the collective survey, an individual-level survey 
was administered to each of the SRG participants. This survey was used to gather information on 
the main explanatory variable, community participation – defined as whether the household or its 
members have participated in twelve project decisions. Consistent with the guidelines in the 
CBPWD these decisions were categorized into four major types of participation – planning and 
implementation, project usage and benefit distribution, maintenance, and monitoring and 
evaluation. In addition, the individual survey gathered information on individual and household 
characteristics, perceptions of PSNP and CBPWD and existing social interactions between and 
within watershed communities.  
The responses of the SRG on the operational and physical status of individual projects 
were supplemented by a technical survey conducted by soil and water conservation engineers. 
These six engineers, each with more than six years of experience with the technical guidelines 
prescribed in the CBPWD manuals and the author visited each of the projects and measured their 
condition in terms of their physical condition and operational status.  
                                                          
13 Of these 1,238 individuals, 52% were female. Except for 21 groups (8%), all the SRGs have at least one female 
member. With regard to age, 67% of the respondents were between the ages of 30 and 50 followed by 20% with above 




The qualitative data collection included eight Key Informant Interviews (KII) – two in 
each district and one focus group discussion (FGD) in each of the 17 villages (kebeles) where the 
SRG and individual surveys were administered.14 The discussions and interviews revolved around 
the implementation of the public works component of the PSNP, views on the relationship 
between the administrative officials and beneficiaries, reasons for participation or non-
participation in public works project decisions.   
4.2 Empirical approach 
A necessary condition for the PSNP to be part of a solution to the country’s food security concerns 
is that infrastructure projects built through the program should be of adequate quality. 
Construction of durable assets is vital for the realization of the long term objective of the PSNP. 
Consistent with this line of argument, the main outcome variable used in this paper is the extent 
of a project’s physical damage as determined by on-site visits conducted by engineers. While it is 
subjective, we also use information provided by the engineers on the functional status of a project.  
Physical condition was rated on a 5 point scale ranging from undamaged to severely 
damaged as well as in terms of the percentage of a project that was damaged.15 Engineers provided 
estimates in terms of the percentage of a project that was damaged and a response based on the 5 
point scale while the SRG provided an estimated based only on a 5 point scale. Operational status 
was defined in terms of a 3 point scale (fully operational, partially operational, non-operational) 
and is a measure of the extent to which a project is meeting the purpose for which it is intended.  
Accordingly, we treat the two outcome variables (Y) for project i located in watershed community 
                                                          
14 The key informants were usually heads of the agriculture office and village administrators or their representatives. 
15 The damage percentage variable is based on the extent of project damage. For instance, if there is a five meter long 
stone bund and about 1 meter is damaged then the damage percentage is recorded as 20 percent. Operational status 
provides an idea of the project’s capacity to generate the expected benefits. The role of a stone bund is to provide 
protection against soil erosion and operational state is defined in relation to how well the project is performing in 




j as a function of, project characteristics (P) and community participation in project decisions (Part), 
ε𝑖𝑗 is an unobserved error term. That is, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆 + 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝜂 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑗𝜇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗         (1) 
Pij includes project specific characteristics such as project type (soil conservation/water harvesting), 
age, mode of construction, that is, completely new or extension of an existing project). Partij in (1) 
includes four measures of participation – that is, participation in planning and implementation, 
project usage and benefit distribution, maintenance, and monitoring and evaluation. Each of these 
four measures indicate the share of households in a structure response group that participated in 
each of the participation decisions.16 Although not shown in (1), the specification also contains a 
set of four district dummies.  
Several concerns may arise while using (1) to estimate the effect of participation on 
outcomes. First, it is possible that communities with certain unobserved traits, for instance, greater 
social cohesion may be more likely to participate. At the same time social cohesion may also 
influence project outcomes, that is Cov (Partij,εij) ≠ 0, and hence OLS estimates of (1) are likely to 
be biased. Second, (1) treats project outcomes as a function of participation. However, the reverse, 
that is, participation itself maybe a function of project outcomes cannot be ruled out. For example, 
if a project is well constructed and yields clear benefits this in turn may lead to greater community 
participation in deciding how project benefits should be distributed and/or how a project should 
be maintained. 
In order to deal with the first issue, in addition to estimating (1) which includes various 
community traits to absorb differences across communities, we estimate a model which includes 
watershed community-fixed effects and explore variation in participation within a watershed 
community to identify effects. This is possible as in most of the watershed communities in the 
                                                          
16 For instance, if there are five members in a structure response group and three indicated that they participated in a 
planning decision, then participation in that decision is 60%. In the first instance, participation in each of twelve 
project decisions was computed in the manner just described and then s aggregated into four participation decisions. 
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survey there are multiple projects (49 of 53 communities) and this enables us to use variation in 
participation within the same watershed community to isolate the effect of participation on 
outcomes (see Figures 1 and 2). That is, we estimate,  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆 + 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝜂 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑗𝜇 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2) 
where 𝜃𝑗  is a watershed community fixed effect.  
To deal with the second issue we divide the measures of participation into those elements 
of participation that occur before project benefits start to flow, that is, participation in project 
planning and implementation and those that occur after the flow of project benefits. While the 
latter measures of participation are more likely to be influenced by reverse causality, for the former, 
this is unlikely. We estimate several variants of (1) and (2).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics – project damage and participation 
Tables 1 to 5 provide summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. As displayed in Table 
1, according to the engineers, the average project damage is 37% and about 55% of the projects 
are fully operational and generate the expected benefits. The average project is about 4.9 years old 
and 63 percent of the projects are meant for soil conservation. About half the projects are 
extensions to existing projects while the remainder are completely new. Table 2 examines the link 
between a project’s physical status and its functional state. The bulk of the highly damaged projects 
are not functioning (72 of 77). However, there is more variation in the other categories. Of the 76 
projects that show very low levels of damage, 21 are not functioning.  While this is surprising, the 
explanation provided by the engineers was that these projects are not badly damaged but they have 
operated long enough and are no longer yielding the expected benefits.  
Community participation in different decisions and sub-decisions is quite high. As shown 
in Table 3, across the 12 decisions, participation ranges from 72 to 83 percent. Of a total of 1,238 
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households, 71 percent have participated in all four decisions at the planning stage. The 
corresponding figures are 73, 71 and 78 percent for decisions relating to project usage and benefit 
distribution, project maintenance, and project monitoring and evaluation respectively (Table 4).17 
Breaking down the participation decisions into those that take place after and before project 
execution (Table 5) shows that 68 percent of the respondents participated in all eight post-project 
execution decisions while the figure is 71 percent for participation before project execution. The 
lack of substantial differences in participation rates before and after project execution suggests that 
participation is not driven by actual receipt of benefits. If this were the case then one would expect 
to find differences in participation rates before and after the project.  
Table 6 delves deeper and examines district-specific patterns in project damage, project 
functional status, participation in project decisions and formation of the CWSDC. Project damage 
is substantially higher, a little above 50 percent, in two of the districts (Kuyu and Arsi Negelle) as 
compared to the lower rates of damage in Doba (25.4%) and Yabello (37%). In terms of the 
operational status, 60% of the projects in Yabello are in good functional state as compared to a 
little below 50 percent in Kuyu. A little more than half the projects (54%) in Arsi Negelle and 
Doba have good functionality. There is marked variation in participation across districts. Almost 
all households participate in decision making across the 12 project decisions in Doba. Participation 
rates in Yabello are also high and range from a low of 75% to a high of 96%. In contrast, rates of 
participation in the other two districts are substantially lower and lie between 12% and 60% in 
Kuyu and between 51% and 75% in Arsi Negelle.18 Despite this marked differences in project 
decision making committee watershed committees have been formed in almost all locations. These 
                                                          
17 See Table 2 for details of numbers and types of decisions falling under each category. 
18 Marginal effects based on ordered probit estimates of participation in different stages of the project cycle while 
controlling for other factors yields the same message, that is, there is substantial variation in participation across the 
four districts (see Table A14 on participation in planning decisions). With the exception of education and duration of 
membership, full participation in project decisions does not seem to depend on respondent’s individual characteristics. 
This implies that selection of individuals to our sample was purely random.  
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patterns indicate that the presence of a committee does not automatically translate into 
participation.  
Qualitative information obtained from Focus Group Discussants underlines these district-
specific differences. A female FGD participant from Doba narrated:    
“I am a PSNP public works beneficiary from the start. Initially we just did what we were told to 
do by the officials but in the last few years things have changed. We received different trainings 
including technical trainings and we take the lead. We first gather and discuss what to do for the 
year and we prioritize based on the allocated person days we get every year. We work closely with 
the development agents and even with those working at the woreda agricultural office.” (Discussed 
in December 2014). 
The reflection from a discussant in one of the villages in Kuyu echoes the opposite: 
“…our participation in the public works is limited to doing what we are told to do by village 
officials. They tell us what activities we have to do, where and when to do it. Although we get 
transfers for six months in the year, we are called for different activities at any time of the year 
even outside the PWs implementation timing. We just follow their order since we do not want to 
risk [being] taken out of the program.” (Discussed in September 2014). 
Information obtained from district level key informants also substantiates the differences found 
in the survey data. For instance, while discussing project participation, a district level key informant 
in Doba remarked: 
“…the follow-up of beneficiaries on the PW projects is incredible. They do beyond what is 
expected as a PW beneficiary. They do see the benefit of their work and their work is acknowledged 
at different levels and it keeps them motivated” (Interviewed on December 2014). 
The perception by a key informant in Kuyu is quite different. While commenting on project 
participation the informant noted:  
“…the public works participants in this village are not enthusiastic about their activities. They work 
just to fulfil their paid person days and not very caring about the quality of the infrastructure. There 
were times they left off uncompleted [SWC] structures just because they completed their person 
days.”  [Interviewed September 2014] 
Overall, there are clear differences in community participation across districts and prima 
facie it seems that project participation and project damage are correlated. The next section provides 




5.2 Participation and project outcomes 
5.2.1 Project damage and participation 
A graphical exploration of the relationship based on locally weighted regressions between each of 
the participation measures and project damage is displayed in Figure 3. Across all the four 
decisions, increasing participation is clearly associated with a decline in project damage. Table 7 
presents a series of estimates of equation 1 with each of the four participation measures included 
sequentially, followed by a specification which includes all the measures. Individually, each of the 
participation measures is negatively associated with project damage but not statistically significant. 
Focusing on the most complete specification, two out of the four participation measures are 
negatively associated with project damage and the effect of participation in project monitoring and 
evaluation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The lack of precision in project usage 
and benefit distribution is not unexpected as participation in the various project decisions is highly 
correlated (see Table A2). Nevertheless, what is clear is that a 10 percentage points increase in 
community participation in project monitoring and evaluation is associated with about a 2 
percentage points reduction in project damage. There are clear differences across districts with 
projects in Doba about 19 percentage points less likely to be damaged as compared to projects in 
other districts. The positive effect of participation in project monitoring and evaluation on project 
damage after controlling for district effects indicates that overall variations in project damage and 
project participation are not driven only by differences across districts but also by variation within 
districts  
 Table 8 provides estimates of equation 2. This specification controls for watershed 
community effects and exploits variation within the 49 watershed communities, where there are 
multiple projects, to identify the effect of participation on project damage. The advantage of such 
a specification is that the effect of participation on project damage is not contaminated by 
differences in characteristics across watershed (or district) communities in characteristics such as 
community leadership or community capacity. Similar to the results in Table 7, each of the 
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individual measures of participation is negatively related to project damage although only 
participation in project monitoring and evaluation is statistically significant again at the 5 percent 
level. Based on the specification that includes the participation measures simultaneously shows 
that participation in monitoring and evaluation decisions is associated with a reduction in project 
damage. In terms of magnitude, a 10 percentage points increase in participation is associated with 
a 3.1 percentage points reduction in project damage.  
These estimates indicate that if a watershed found in a district with low participation were 
to enhance participation in monitoring and evaluation to a high level – say from 57 percent in 
Kuyu to the level of participation in Doba (95%) – then project damage would decline by 12 
percent or about 50 percent of the gap in project damage between the two districts may be 
attributed to differences in participation in monitoring and evaluation. These are large effects.  
Elaborating on the record of high participation and better project outcome, an FGD 
participant from (Lega Lencha village) in Doba district narrates his case: 
“We [The beneficiaries] were not really in to the projects the way we are now. We didn’t follow 
the structures and just come only for the sake of attendance. Thanks to a former district level 
agriculture office head who changed the district’s picture completely. What he did was he selected 
some PW beneficiaries (including myself) from different villages in the district and sent us on an 
experience sharing visit to a village called Abraha Wa Atsbha in Tigray region which at the time 
had an outstanding performance on SWC. It was like ‘Heaven in the middle of Hell!’ Everything 
was green, fresh wind blowing and plantation on the revived land throughout. PW beneficiaries of 
the village shared their experience and trained us on building and maintaining SWC structures. We 
came back to our village with a different attitude towards the SWC structures. We took our turn 
of sharing what we saw and training other beneficiaries who did not get the chance of going there. 
Although the performance is not similar across the villages in Doba, we are proud that we are 
among the top performing districts in the region as well as the country. We now go to different 
PSNP districts all over the country to train others and others also come to our district to share our 
experience and get ‘peer-to-peer’ training.” [Discussed in December 2014] 
Another participant of FGD in Dherito village in Yabello district discusses: 
“We learnt our lesson the hard way. In the previous regimes, our zone [Borena] was known for its 
huge livestock production. At the time we did not care much about the environment (soil and 
water degradation with its consequence on our small farming and animal fodder). We woke up 
very late but we are now trying our best to benefit as much as we can from the SWC structures. It 
is different when you learn it the hard way. You become result focused and concerned about the 




5.2.2 Project operational state and participation 
Table 9 provides estimates of the effect of participation but this time with a project’s operational 
status as the outcome variable. This variable is constructed as a binary variable which indicates 
whether the project is functioning well or not (includes partially and no-operational). As shown in 
Column 5 of the Table, once again, increase in community participation in project use and benefit 
distribution, and project monitoring and evaluation decisions increase the probability that a project 
is functioning well. The estimates from a linear probability model controlling for community 
watershed fixed effects in Table 10 yield a similar positive effect of participation in project 
monitoring and evaluation on a project’s functional state. The positive, and relatively sharp, effect 
of participation in project monitoring and evaluation is also captured in Figure 4 which explores 
the bivariate relationship between project functional state and participation based on a locally 
weighted regression.    
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study was motivated by the limited evidence on the quality of rural infrastructure built through 
public works based social safety nets. While such programs have been rolled out in a number of 
countries, the contribution of such programs to the creation of rural infrastructure which is 
expected to serve as basis for rural development and food security has not attracted much 
systematic scrutiny. Indeed, maintaining the quality and durability of such rural infrastructure is a 
costly problem for developing countries.  
This study, which was based on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program, examined the 
effect of the program’s community-based approach in determining the quality of rural assets. The 
study was based on a sample of 249 Soil and Water Conservation (SWC) projects located in 53 
watershed communities in four food insecure districts in Oromia region and dealt with three 
aspects. First, the paper analyzed the degree of community participation in project decision 
making. Second, the paper used soil and water conservation engineers to provide a technical 
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assessment of the projects in terms of their project damage and whether they were fully 
operational. Third, the paper examined the role of community participation in influencing project 
outcomes.  
We found a high degree of participation ranging from 72 to 83 percent across 12 
participation decisions. Despite the overall high rate of participation, there were substantial 
variations in participation rates across the four districts. Paralleling the variation in participation, 
project damage was about 50 percent in districts with relatively low levels of participation and 
about half that in areas with almost complete participation. We were able to exploit the availability 
of multiple projects located in the same watershed community to identify the effect of variations 
in community participation on variations in project outcomes within the same community. This 
yields a more credible estimate of the effect of participation on outcomes as compared to 
approaches which rely on variations across communities to identify the effect of participation. We 
found that community participation in project monitoring and evaluation played a substantial role 
in enhancing the physical and operational state of projects. The estimates indicated that increasing 
community involvement in areas which have relatively low participation rates (57%) to the rate 
observed in areas with high participation (95%) maybe expected to reduce project damage by 50%. 
This is a large effect and shows that good design features, in this case, participation plays a strong 
role in ensuring the durability of PSNP-built infrastructure.  
Notwithstanding these effects and the use of variations within a watershed to achieve 
identification, it is possible that it is the flow of project benefits, say a well-functioning project that 
enhances participation and not only that participation leads to better project outcomes. The paper 
also did not consider what drives project participation. Nevertheless, the results in this paper 
provide supporting evidence to the argument that increasing community participation in project 
decision is associated with more durable rural infrastructure and that at least in the Ethiopian case 
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   Project Damage (%) Share of project that is damaged 37.12 
(28.14) 
   Project operational state Fully operational = 1 0.55 
Project characteristics 
   Project make   Project is new or an extension, new =1 0.50 
   Project type  Soil conservation projects=1 0.63 
   Project age (years) Number of years since project constructed 4.88 
(2.15) 
Community watershed characteristics 
   Distance from the district town (km) Distance of watershed from nearest (large) 
district town  
19.97 
(10.70) 
   School availability Is there a primary/junior (secondary) school 
in the watershed, Yes = 1 
0.41 
   Access to water Does the watershed have facility for potable 
water, Yes = 1 
0.31 
   Access to electricity Does the watershed have access to 
electricity, Yes = 1 
0.09 
   Access to health facility Does the watershed have health 
center/facilities, Yes =1  
0.23 
   Cultivable land size (hectares) Total cultivable land size for all households 




   Yabello The district where the project is located 0.22 
   Kuyu 0.18 
   Arsi Negelle 0.18 
   Doba 0.42 
Notes: N = 249 
Table 2 
Project operational state and damage state – Engineer provided 
Operational state 
Damage state Total 
Highly damaged 
(>50 %)  
Slight damage 




Functioning 5 75 55 135 
Not functioning 72 20 21 113 
Total 77 95 76 248 
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Table 3  
Description of variables and Means (Std. Dev.): Individual level 
Participation in planning Response takes a value of 1, if a household or its members 
have participated in decision making  in each of these 12 
individual participation questions 
0.79 
   Project type selection 0.77 
   Project site selection  0.81 
   Project scale (length, capacity) 0.77 
   Project timing  0.83 
Project usage and benefit distribution 0.77 
   Project usage rules  0.78 
   Nature of sanctions on misuse 0.77 
   Benefits distribution  0.75 
Maintenance 0.77 
   Maintenance system, rules and policy 0.76 
   Maintenance labor contribution  0.83 
   Sanctions for failure to contribute  0.72 
Maintenance 0.80 
   Project monitoring activities 0.79 
   Evaluation of the program 0.81 
Respondent’s traits 
   Female Respondent is female 0.52 
   Age Respondent’s age in complete years 42.5 
(12.9) 
   Religion Respondent’s religion, 1=Non-Muslim 0.43 
   Education level Education level of the respondent 
      No education 0.75 
      Primary education 0.23 
      Secondary and above education 0.02 
   Household size Number of family members 6.2 
(2.1) 
   Female headed household Head of the household is female, Yes = 1 0.26 
   Duration of membership Number of years in the PSNP 2.9 
(2.1) 
Perception of PSNP & CBPWD 
   PSNP addresses food insecurity Do your trust that PSNP addresses your food security 
problems, Yes = 1 
0.95 
   PSNP well targeted Do your think that PSNP is properly targeted (no problem 
in inclusion/exclusion), Yes = 1 
0.88 
   Aware of CBPWD Are you aware of the CBPWD approach of the PSNP 
program, Yes = 1 
0.24 
Social Interactions 
   Trust PSNP members Do you trust PSNP beneficiaries more than non-
beneficiaries? 1=Yes 
0.18 
   Conflict between watershed communities Have you ever experienced conflict/disagreement with 
regard to people living in different watershed? Yes = 1 
0.01 
   Conflict within watershed communities Have you ever experienced conflict/disagreement with 





Community participation in project decisions 
Number of 
Decisions 
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N (%) 
Table 5 
Community participation: Before and after project execution 





















5 - 21 
(1.7) 
6 - 28 
(2.3) 
7 - 65 
(5.4) 










   District    
Overall Yabello Kuyu  Arsi Negelle Doba 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Project outcomes           
   Project damage 36.8 82.2 50.8 27.1 50.5 29.2 25.4 25.8 37.1 28.1 
   Project functional status (1=functional) 0.61  0.49  0.54  0.54  0.55  
Participation in project decision  





















   Project type selection decision 75.18 33.36 44.89 29.89 61.74 38.83 97.88 7.84 76.70 33.31 
   Project site selection decision 87.54 26.48 49.67 31.12 65.22 36.86 97.69 8.95 80.81 30.85 
   Project scale selection decision 87.68 24.99 39.11 33.02 60.27 38.09 94.42 18.37 76.64 34.57 
   Project time frame selection decision 89.39 24.21 60.44 36.30 64.56 36.62 96.22 12.00 82.42 29.99 
After project implementation decisions (%) 89.21 20.58 39.54 31.53 57.44 37.93 97.66 7.63 77.89 32.99 
Use & Benefit Distribution decisions (%) 89.66 22.12 31.11 37.69 57.21 38.72 98.74 5.61 76.88 36.46 
   Project usage decision 91.88 18.91 37.33 39.68 56.30 41.81 98.85 6.39 78.28 36.03 
   Nature of sanctions for project misuse decision 88.01 25.32 29.33 37.32 62.61 36.90 98.72 5.45 77.24 36.34 
   Distribution of project benefit decision 89.10 24.88 26.67 40.68 52.72 42.58   98.85 6.64 75.11 39.60 
Maintenance of project decisions (%) 86.08 25.68 30.18 24.87 63.37 36.24   98.76 6.21 77.08 33.97 
   Maintenance system, policy and rules  85.97 25.56 28.89 40.13 57.83 42.00   98.72 6.64 75.78 38.28 
   Labor contribution for maintenance decision 88.32 23.66 49.33 41.69 75.33 35.12   98.72 6.64 83.21 31.57 
   Nature of sanctions for failure to contribute in   
   project maintenance  
83.97 30.03 12.33 24.37 56.96 42.58  98.85 6.12 72.25 40.79 
Project monitoring and evaluation  (%) 91.88 16.91 57.33 42.34 51.74 43.27   95.48 14.54 79.72 34.34 
   Time-to-time project monitoring 88.17 24.79 54.89 43.52 52.61 43.69  95.10 15.64 78.48 35.73 
   Evaluation of project effectiveness 95.58 12.18 59.78 44.13 50.87 43.35   95.86 14.05 80.97 34.49 
Community Watershed Committee Formed (1=Yes) 0.83  0.80  0.93  0.92  0.88  
Observations 54 45 46 104 249  





Project damage and participation – district fixed effects 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Planning -0.12 0.12 
(0.06) (0.18) 
Project use & benefit distribution. -0.15 -0.22
(0.14) (0.21)
Project maintenance -0.12 0.21
(0.16) (0.25)
Monitoring and evaluation -0.15 -0.20**
(0.08) (0.06)
Kuyu 5.10** 0.37 2.50 4.41*** 5.56
(1.06) (5.95) (6.66) (0.37) (7.89)
Arsi Negelle 10.11*** 7.87 10.08** 6.64* 4.76
(1.12) (3.76) (3.04) (2.64) (2.76)
Doba -15.31** -15.60* -15.45* -16.32** -18.55**
(4.50) (4.96) (5.77) (4.21) (5.21)
Constant 58.51*** 62.06*** 58.74** 62.56*** 60.03***
(7.50) (9.78) (11.07) (8.42) (12.45)
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 
Adj-Rsq 0.175 0.183 0.174 0.189 0.188 
Notes: District clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
specifications control for project specific characteristics (age, make and type).  
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Table 8 
Project damage and participation – watershed community fixed effects 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Planning -0.110 -0.019
(0.097) (0.143)
Project use & benefit distribution -0.061 0.100
(0.089) (0.156)
Project maintenance -0.052 0.108
(0.081) (0.154)
Monitoring and evaluation -0.186** -0.306**
(0.084) (0.151)
Constant 50.60*** 47.40*** 46.69*** 55.65*** 50.32***
(9.67) (9.88) (9.85) (8.28) (9.75) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
Adj-Rsq 0.183 0.178 0.177 0.197 0.192 
Notes: Watershed clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
specifications control for watershed fixed effects and project specific characteristics (age, make and type).   
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Table 9 
Project functional state and participation 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Planning 0.0006 -0.0038
(0.0005) (0.0029)
Project use & benefit distribution 0.0018 0.0056
(0.0021) (0.0030)
Project maintenance 0.0007 -0.0054
(0.0019) (0.0027)
Monitoring and evaluation 0.0017 0.0035
(0.0014) (0.0017)
Kuyu 0.0061 0.0899 0.0268 0.0368 -0.0117
(0.0432) (0.0960) (0.0815) (0.0335) (0.0502)
Arsi Negelle -0.0429** 0.0020 -0.0398 0.0952 0.0601
(0.0118) (0.0544) (0.0278) (0.0397) (0.0382)
Doba 0.0948 0.0857 0.0936 0.0952 0.1631*
(0.0778) (0.0873) (0.0929) (0.0757) (0.0618)
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 
Adj-Rsq 0.015 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.033 
Notes: District clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
specifications control for project specific characteristics. 
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Table 10 
Project functional state and participation 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Planning -0.0001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Project use & benefit distribution 0.0002 0.003
(0.002) (0.004)
Project maintenance -0.001 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
Monitoring and evaluation 0.002 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
Adj-Rsq 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.034 0.034 
Notes: Watershed clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All 
specifications control for watershed fixed effects and project specific characteristics (age, make and 
type).   
34 
Maps and Figures 
Map 1 
Location of study districts 
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Figure 1 
Note: The figure plots average project damage score (in percent) across the 49 watershed communities 
based on engineers’ measurement with difference across points representing difference in project damage 
between watershed communities. 
Figure 2 
Note: The figure displays variation in project damage score within the 49 watershed communities i.e. each 
point is obtained by subtracting community mean damage from each project damage score.    
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Figure 3 
Note: The figure displays the distribution and locally weighted bivariate regression of the outcome on 
project damage with the four measures of participation. 
Figure 4 
Note: The figure plots the distribution and locally weighted bivariate regression of project’s functional state 




Distribution of soil and water conservation structures surveyed per district (Planned vs 
actual) 
District Number of Soil and water conservation 
structures Actual/planned 











Yabello 5 75 4 54 72 
Kuyu 4 60 4 45 75 
Arsi Negelle 2 40 3 46 115 
Doba 6 120 6 104 87 
Total 17 295 17 249 84 
Table A2 













Project planning 1.00 
Project use rule & benefit distribution 0.830*** 1.00 
Project maintenance 0.812*** 0.941*** 1.00 
Project monitoring & evaluation 0.734*** 0.785*** 0.780*** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A3  












(0-25 percent damage) 
Highly damaged (>50 
percent damage) 15 8 3 26 
Slightly damaged (25-50 
percent damage) 26 21 3 50 
Very little damage 
/undamaged 36 66 70 172 
Total 77 95 76 248 
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Table A4 
Project functional status: Structure Response Group versus Engineer’s Evaluation 
SRG 
Engineer      Total 
Functioning Not functioning 
Functioning 131 92 223 
Not functioning 5 21 26 
Total 136 113 249 
Table A5 












(0-25 percent damage) 
Functioning 21 37 165 223 
Not functioning 5 13 8 26 
Total 26 50 173 249 
Table A6 
Project physical condition/damage: Project Response Group versus Engineer’s 











(0-25 percent damage) 
Highly damaged (>50 
percent damage) - 1 - 1 
Slightly damaged (25-50 
percent damage) 6 4 - 10 
Very little damage 
/undamaged 12 17 13 42 
Total 18 22 13 53 
Table A7 
Project functional status: Structure Response Group versus Engineer’s Evaluation: 
Yabello district 
SRG 
Engineer      Total 
Functioning Not functioning 
Functioning 30 19 49 
Not functioning 3 2 5 




Project physical condition/damage: Project Response Group versus Engineer’s 











(0-25 percent damage)  
Highly damaged (>50 




Slightly damaged (25-50 
percent damage) 11 4 - 
 
15 
Very little damage 
/undamaged 6 16 3 
 
25 
Total 21 21 3 45 
 
Table A9 
Project functional status: Structure Response Group versus Engineer’s Evaluation: Kuyu 
district 
SRG 
Engineer      Total 
Functioning Not functioning 
Functioning 21 12 33 
Not functioning 1 11 12 
Total 22 23 45 
 
Table A10  
Project physical condition/damage: Project Response Group versus Engineer’s 











(0-25 percent damage)  
Highly damaged (>50 
percent damage) 3 - - 
 
3 
Slightly damaged (25-50 
percent damage) 6 2 - 
 
8 
Very little damage 
/undamaged 12 14 9 
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Project functional status: Structure Response Group versus Engineer’s Evaluation: Arsi 
Negelle district 
SRG 
Engineer      Total 
Functioning Not functioning 
Functioning 24 16 40 
Not functioning 1 5 6 




Project physical condition/damage: Project Response Group versus Engineer’s 











(0-25 percent damage)  
Highly damaged (>50 




Slightly damaged (25-50 
percent damage) 3 11 3 
 
17 
Very little damage 
/undamaged 6 19 45 
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Project functional status: Structure Response Group versus Engineer’s Evaluation: Doba 
district 
SRG 
Engineer      Total 
Functioning Not functioning 
Functioning 56 45 101 
Not functioning - 3 3 















Respondent’s characteristics      
Female 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.014    
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034)    
Age 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.001  
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001)    
Religion: Non-Muslim 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.007 -0.032    
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.044)    
Primary education  -0.023** -0.012** -0.015** -0.015** 0.065**  
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.030)    
Secondary and above education -0.036** -0.021* -0.029* -0.032 0.119*   
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.065)    
Household size -0.002 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 0.005    
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)    
Female headed household 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.022    
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.037)    
Duration of membership  0.007*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)    
Perception of PSNP & CBPWD      
PSNP addresses food insecurity -0.020 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 0.052    
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.042)    
PSNP well targeted  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006    
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.032)    
Aware of CBPWD -0.059*** -0.031*** -0.043*** -0.046*** 0.179*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.021)    
Social Interactions      
Trust PSNP members  -0.012 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 0.035    
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028)    
Conflict between watershed streams 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.016   
 (0.058) (0.027) (0.034) (0.032) (0.151)    
Conflict within watershed stream  0.064* 0.026** 0.030*** 0.026*** -0.145**  
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.062)    
District      
Kuyu 0.294*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.052*** -0.499*** 
 (0.043) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.047)    
Arsi Negelle 0.170*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.049*** -0.338*** 
 (0.045) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.068)    
Doba -0.086*** -0.041*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 0.234*** 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.042)    
N 1,202 1,202 1,202 1,202 1,202 
Pseudo R-sq 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199 
Notes: The specification controls for individual and household characteristics and perceptions on the 
PSNP and social interactions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
